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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDITH~. GARDNER, ) 
1'/ai ntiff, Respondent ( 
vs. Ca:-;t> No. 73J2 
EARL W. GARDNER, ( 
Defendant, Appellant J 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
~TATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
In this case the plaintiff-respondent filed an action 
to dissolve the bonds of rnatrimony existing between the 
plaintil'f and the defendant alleging rnental cruelty and 
non-support in her cornplaint. Appellant-defendant 
denied the jurisdictional facts alleged in tlw complaint 
and also denied the allegations of rnental cruelty and 
non-support. Defendant further alleged that plaintiff 
herself was guilt~~ of misconduct and that she had con-
doned any misconduct on the defendant·~ part (R. 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12 and 14). A decrt>e of divon·e wa~ entered 
in favor of the plaintiff-re::;pondent based on rnental 
cruelty '(H. :2;>). rrhis is an appeal frorn the decree. 
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This appeal presents three basic questions (1) whether 
the lower court had jurisdiction to enter a decree, (2) 
whether on the evidence the decree of divorce was 
proper, and (3) whther the plaintiff was entitled to an 
allowance for attorney's fee. 
The respondent and appellant were married at Poc-
atello, Idaho, on June 15, 1948 (R. 8), and the respon-
dent filed an action for divorce approximately four 
months later on October 28, 1948 (R. 3). The appellant 
was a friend of the respondent's fmnily (R. 73). The 
parties had known each other for twenty years, and 
during that time appellant and respondent had been in 
each other's cmnpany quite a bit. Before the marriage, 
the parties had discussed getting ma-rried at an earlier 
time, but the appellant preferred to wait until arrange-
ments were made to take care of respondent's mother 
(R. 63, 64, 129 and 130). 'rhe respondent's mother was 
in poor health and she wa~ with the appellant anrl 
respondent from the time of their marriage until the 
divorce action was filed. The appellant only had two 
days alone with his wife when relatiYes and friends 
were not present. (R. 141). In the brief period of the 
marriage a few quarrels resulted. The parties did not 
have a serious quarrel pertaining to themselves individ-
ually--Pvery disagreement the~· had concerned a friend 
or relative (R. 140). How<->YPr, the appellant was kinrl 
and considerate of his mother-in-law who lived with him 
during the marriage (see paragraph 11 of Finding-~ 
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of Faet. R. :2:~. abo H. 149). 
Prior to the n1arriage the respondent lived wtih her 
mother in Log-an, l ~ tah, while the appellant lived on 
a fann which he owned at Santaquin, l~tah (H. 127). 
~\ t the tiine of the Inarriage, he was in the process of 
f;elling it (H. G;) ). rrhe sale was cmnpleted on Septem--
ber 23, 19-t~. at which time the appellant moved his 
things away frmn the fann (H. 127 and 128). At the 
tiiue of the Inarriage, the parties had planned on 1naking 
a trip leaving Logan, going through Yellowstone Park, 
~r ontana, \Yashington and down the Pacific Coast until 
the:· found a plaeP th<>y liked for a pennanent home 
(H. 128). This trip never Inaterialir.ed, the nwther waR 
ill and couldn't he left alone so the parties stayed at 
the home of the respondent's mother in Logan, 1 ~tali 
(R. 38, ti:), 6-l:, 65 and 66). The appellant never intended 
to lll~lkP Logan l1is hmne (H. 129). \Vithin a day or so 
<~ftpr the sale of the farn1 was complete (September 2~. 
1 D-iS), the parties packed their belonging~ and left for 
California to rnake their hon1e (R. -l-8, 130 and 131). 
'Tlw~· took the nwther-in-law along with them (H. 131). 
Before the rnarriage the partie~ had visited Cali-
fornia (R. 129) and had definitel:· decided to Inake 
California their home after the 111arriagP (H. ();) and 
131 ). 'YhilP in Ftah, the partiP~ had written to real 
<·:-;tatP men in California in an E~ffort to line up a place 
to livE:> ( H.(ili). They paek<><l their belongings, took part 
of theu1 with theu1 and left tlw relllain<lP r in a c-ondition 
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4 
to be shipped at a later tin1e (R. 131 and 66). They 
left Utah intending to make California their home (R. 66 
and 131, Defendant's Exhibit I). After they had arrived 
in California, they imrnediatel~' began looking for a 
home to buy and finally found one that was suitable. 
They both signed the contract for the purchase of the 
home which was located at Windsor, California, and 
made payments on the purchase price (R. 49, 61 and 
132). The appellant took the proceeds from the sale 
of his farm ( $4000.00), and the respondent added 
$1400.00 of her own money and a joint bank account 
was established in a California bank (R. 50 and 132). 
While waiting for the home they had purchased to be 
vacated, the parties quarreled, and they made a trip 
back to Utah, arriving October 16, 1948 (R. 51 and 146). 
Only twelve days later the respondent filed a divorce 
action in the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache, 
alleging that she had been a bon~ fide resident of Cache 
County for more than three rnonths prior to the filing 
of the action (R. 3). After the divorce action was 
conunenced the appellant returned to California to do 
some remodeling work on the home that they had pur-
chased (R. 59 and 136). He thought that the divorce 
action would be called off (R. 1;)5). The appellant wrote 
respondent a letter from Cailfornia, sent her $50.00 for 
a ticket and asked her to return to hin1 (R. 139 and 70). 
The appellant considered him~elf still a resident of 
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California (R. 70, 1-!0 and 190). He owns no property 
in rtah (R. 188). 
~TArl,E~IENrr OF ERROR 
Appellant relies upon the following errors committed 
by the trial court for reversal of the judgrnent decree 
of thi~ Court below: 
1. The trial court erred in entering a decree in favor 
of the plaintiff since tlw lower court did not have 
jurisdiction to render a divorce decree. 
2. The court erred in entering paragraph one of 
it~ Findings of Facts for the reason that the undisputed 
evidence shows that the plaintiff was not a bona fide 
resident of the State of Utah, in the County of Cache, 
for nwre than three months prior to the cmnrnencmnent 
of the action. 
:~. The court erred in awarding to the plaintiff judg-
ment against the defendant for attorney's fees in thf' 
;-;mu of $1;10.00 for the reason that the plaintiff neither 
allt-g·pfl nor approved an attorney'~ fPP. 
-!-. The court erred in entering paragraph eight of 
tlu· Findings of Facts for tliP reason that the plaintiff 
neither alleged nor approved any attonw)''s fee. 
:>. r_rhe court t-rred in entering a decree of divorce 
in l"a\'OI' of the plaintiff for the reason that the evidence 
dew~ not support or justify a dPel'PP of divorce in favor 
o t' tlte plaintiff. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
6. The court erred in entering paragraphs four, five 
and six of the F"'indings of Facts for the reason that 
said paragraphs are not supported by the evidence. 
7. The court erred in entering paragraphs, one, two, 
three, four, five and six of the Conclusions of Law for 
the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction to 
enter a decree, and for the further reason that the 
evidence does not support nor justify a decree in favor 
of the plaintiff. 
POINT NO. I-rrHE LOWER COURT DID NOT 
HAVE JURISDICTION TO J1jNTER A DECREE 
OF DIVORCE. 
This point coven; Assignment of Errors No. 1 and 
No.2. 
The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Gardner owned 
property and lived in Santaquinn, 1I tah, prior to the 
rnarriage, and that his ownership continued down unit] 
September 23, 1948, and that he had a place to live on. 
his farm even though a part of the premises was occu--
pied by a tenant. He considered himself domiciled in 
Santaquinn and while selling the farm at Santaquinn, 
he temporarily sta?ed in Logan with the plaintiff. l\f rs. 
Gardner admitted that even before the marriage they 
were discussing California as their future home. Ther<' 
is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that thesr 
parties intended to rnake their permanent home in Logan 
with Mrs. Yonk. It would seem (•lear that the stay in 
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Logan wa8 n1erely tetnporary while the farm property 
in Santaquinn wa8 being sold. It is submitted that the 
ten1porary arrangement in Logan was not sufficient to 
constitute Logan a8 the domicile of the parties during 
that period of tin1e (see l(idman vs. Kidman, 164 P 2d 
201, in which this Court stated, ''We assume that the 
phrase 1neans the maintenance therein of something 
more than a In ere •legal residence' ''.). 
In Septen1ber, 1948, after the farm property was 
sold, the parties packed their belongings, took the full 
proceeds of the farm sale, together with $1400.00 of 
:\Irs. Gardner's money, and rnoved to California, pur-
chased a home and opened a bank account. Even Mrs. 
Gardner stated that it was their intention to live in 
California if they could make a go of it. Mr. Gardner 
is nwre emphatic that the parties definitely intended 
to make California their hon1e. However, Mrs. Gard-
ner'~ intention, even with its reservation, is sufficient 
to constitute California their horne. Section 31 of Vol-
mne 17, Auwrican .Jurisprudence, at Page 609 sets down 
the well established rule that if a person is actually 
rnoved fron1 one place to another with intention of 
remaining in the latter place for an indefinite time, 
suel1 latter place is deemed the domicile, notwithstanding 
he may entertain a floating intention to return to his 
previous domicile at sorne future time. Section 24 oi 
the sarne volume at Page 605 restates this general rule 
and eonfirn1s the position of appellant that the partie~ 
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did make California their home and were domicile<\ 
there at the time this divorce action was com1nenced. 
It is undisputed frmn the evidence that the partiet-' 
deposited large sums of money in a joint bank account 
in California, purchased a hmne which they hoth selected, 
and were waiting in ( ~alifornia for the hmne to become 
vacant so Hwy could permanently move into it. Section 
33 of the same volume of American .Juris prudence at 
Page 611 states the general rule that a person nwvin~ot 
into a state with the intention of 1naking his home. 
obtains his dmnicile in that State although he has not 
settled in a permanent home there (see also ;) A. L. R. 
298, 16 A. L. R. 1298, White v. Tennant, 8 S. E. 596). 
The fact that :Mr. Gardner regarded California his home 
is further borne out by the fact that after the California 
home became vacant he entered into it and made 
extensive repairs and he remodeled the place. He got 
it ready for his wife and requested that she come and 
live at their home. However, in the meantime, she hacl 
returned to Logan, and after being in rtah for thP 
~hort period of twelve days, slle counnenced divoree 
proceedings. 
Section 40-3-1, 1 T tah Code Annotated, 1943, provide~ 
that the Court shall have jurisdiction to hear a divoree 
('as(:' if the plaintiff has been an actual and bona fid(' 
resident of the State and of tlw ( ~ounty in which action 
is brought for three months next prior to thP cmnmence-
ment of the action. 1t is submitted that regardless o( 
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the way the facts are interpreted, it is clear that thi~ 
requiren1ent was not met. ~I rH. Gardner had only been 
in the ~tate twelve days at the tiine she filed her 
Complaint. Prior to that tirne, she was a resident of 
( 
1
alifornia and prior to her residence in California, -she 
was don1iciled in Santaquinn, Utah, with her husband 
(Section :21, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of 
Laws). The caHe of Speak vs. Speak, 19 P 2d 386, 
states the rule that the husband's domicile is the wife's 
dornicile, and that the husband has the right to change 
that domicile. Mr. Gardner considered himself domi-
ciled in Santaquinn until he changed his domicile to 
California. He considered, and the facts certainly sup-
port him, that the stay in Logan, Utah, was merely 
ternporary and did not constitute a residence within the 
meaning of Section 40-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 
(Kidman vs. ICidman supra; Grant vs. Lawrence, 108 
· Pac. 931). 
Ij~ven though it is argued that the domicile of both 
of the parties was in Logan, Utah, prior to the time 
tlw~· left for California, and that that they did not 
acquire a perrnanent domicile in California, neverthe-
less 1\Irs. Gardner was only in the State for twelve days 
immediately prior to the commencement of the action. 
It seems ('onclusive that the lower Court did not haYt' 
jurisdic-tion to Pnter an interlocutor~· divorce decree 
( 159 .:\. L. R. -!!)1; Sneed vs. Sneed, 123 Pac. 312). 
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POINT NO. II-Fr \VAS AN AH tTSB~ OF TH~~ 
COrRT 'S DISCR:B~rf1ION TO ALLOW RESPOND-
ENT AN ATrrORNEY'S FEE. 
This point covers Assignrnent of Errors No. 3 and 
~ 0. 4. rrhe respondent's original cmnplaint and her 
amended complaint contained absolutely no allegations 
concerning an allowance of an attorney's fee to th<c~ 
respondent. Furthermore, there was no prayer in the 
original or arnended complaint asking for an· allowancP 
for an attorney's fee. At the trial of the action, thP 
respondent failed to introduce any evidence concerning 
an allowance of an attorney's fee, and the appellant 
specifically objected to any award to the plaintiff for 
an attorney's fee (R. 203). Although it may well be 
argued that the Court can set an attorney's fee in a 
divorce without taking te~timony (see Anderson vt-~. 
Anderson, 181 Pac. 168. and .Jenkins vs. .Jenkins, 1 :l::1 
P 2d 262), still it is suhrnitted that it i~ an abuse of 
the Court's descretion to award an attorney's fee in 
this case in the absence of allegations, a prayer, or any 
proof concerning such fpes. There was no issue before thP 
Court on the matter and no attorn<>~-'~ fpp should be 
allowed. 
POINT NO. III-rrHJ1J J·~VIDE~CE BE~FORij~ rri I 1~~ 
COrRT DORS NOT .Tr~T1FY THR FINDl~O~ 
OF FACT, CONCLlT~;IONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE. 
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This point covers Assign1nent of Erros No. 5, 6 
and 7. The Findings of Fact, upon which this decree 
i~ based, ~tate in substance that the appellant was of 
a quarrelsmne nature and jealous of the respondent's 
relatiYes and because of a few quarrels was guilty of 
1uental cruelty. An exa1nination of the record will show 
that these quarrels did not result solely because of any 
bad ten1per or jealousy upon the part of the appellant, 
but that if fault in these quarrels is to be placed, the 
respondent n1ust bear a full share of any responsibility 
for these quarrels. They were not unprovoked or 
unjustified. The evidence shows that the respondent was 
a highly nervous, irritable woman, who had a quick 
te1nper, and that frequently the appellant was the recip-
ient of the effects of this ten1per (R. 53 and 57). The 
appellant in his arnended answer to the amended com--
plaint alleges as affirmative defense that the respondent 
herself was guilty of misconduct. It is a fundamental 
rule that if both parties to the action are guilty of mis-
conduct, then neither party can recover a divorce 
(Ahlbmn vs. Ahlborn, 204 P 99: Hartwell vs. Hartwell, 
6~) Pac. 205.) Although it is not possible to quote the 
rather voluminous record to bear out the appellant'~ 
contention, it is felt that the record will arnply support 
thP proposition that the respondent's conduct toward 
tlw appellant was anything but exemplary, and cer-
tainly she does not come before the Court as the innocent 
vietim of the appellant's jealous or bad disposition (R. 
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82, 92 and 101). 
Furthermore, we feel that the alleged acts of mentai 
cruelty are trivial and inconsequential. Approximately 
five quarrels form the basis of respondent's claim of 
mental cruelty (R. 38, 40, 47, 51 and :>2). Each party 
had a different explanation of the reason for the quar-
rels and who was to blarne. It is impossible to give 
citations to the record; the record as a whole must be 
read on this point. Thos quarrels involved matters 
which the parties should have adjusted and resolved 
between thernselves. Certainly the divorce laws do not 
guarantee a woman that she will not have smne quarrels 
with her husband. Admittedly, there were more quar-
rels here than ·one would like to see in a marriage 
relation, but it should be remen1bered that this husband 
and wife were living under ver~~ tr~-ing circumstances. 
\\T e have pointed out where the parties had their mother-
in-law with them throughout the entire marriage. The 
husband and wife were only alone for approximately 
forty-eight hours. There wa~ the problem of the care 
of an elderl~- mother-in-law, who was ill. The parties 
for several months did not have a home of their own, 
and it wasn't until the~, mov_ed to California did they 
acquire one. The parties were passing through a transi-
tion period in attempting to adjust themselves to ·their 
new lives. The respondent was ha~ty in filing the 
divorce action, but she felt that she couldn't turn bacl\ 
after the action had been filed ( R. 140 and 155). 1\) 
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ha~P a dinH'ee on the fliln~~· eYidenee of this case is to 
write in ~Pdion 40->>-1. Ptah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
mnended the grounds of tmnporary incon1patability and 
rt-~t it under the grounds of rnental curelty (Cawley vs. 
Cawley, :202 Pac. 10). Before too much emphasis is 
placed on the trivial quarrels of the parties, it shoulcl 
be pointed out again that the appellant was an old 
friend of the fan1ily, had known the respondt'nt for over 
twenty year~. and that evPn before the marriage, the 
parties had quarreled and had disputes (R. 106). 
Even though it is felt that these trivial quarrels con-
stituted 1nental cruelty on the part of the husband, still 
it should be noted that the parties lived together as 
husband and wife as late as the first part of October; 
1948, (the Complaint was filed toward the last part 
of October, 1948). The respondent expressed himself 
that that period had been the happiest of her life (R. 82). 
The appellant alleged as an affirmative defense condon-
ation. This cohabition of the respondent with appellant 
in California and on the trip back to Ftah condoned 
improper acts, if any, of the appellant which occurred 
before that time·(R. 143 and 89). Certainly, a finding 
of rnental cruelty cannot be based on the minor things 
that occurred when the parties returned to Utah (Barr 
vs. Barr, 10 S.W. (2d) 884~ Hammond vs. Hammond, 
132 N.E. 72-!: Heard vs. Heard, 272 S.W. 501). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Court lacked 
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jurisdiction to enter an interlocutory degree of divorce, 
and furthermore that the Court had insufficient evidence 
upon which to base a decree of divorce or the award of 
an attorney's fee, and that the judgment of the lower 
Court should be reversed and the Complaint dismissed. 
lH ~ LLFJN & BELL 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
